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BOOKS REVIEWED

Justice Denied: The Case for Reform of the Courts. By Leonard Downie,
Jr. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1971. Pp. 224. $6.95.
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."' While obviously not embracing the platform advocated by Shakespeare's rebels, Leonard Downie, in
Justice Denied, is similarly vitriolic toward the legal profession. Even before
launching the reader into the ensuing panoptic excursion through the faltering
legal system, Downie asserts that probably a lawyer could not have written, and
will not find palatable, his critical expos6. 2 Downie heralds his own freedom from
the "pressures and narrow traditions of the legal profession" and contrasts the
bondage of the lawyer who is taught, starting in law school, to preserve this "best
of all possible systems" against attack from those seeking drastic change.8
Throughout the following excursion, this disillusionment with the legal profession
periodically surfaces. Chapter two, for example, depicts a large segment of the
criminal defense bar as egregiously incompetent and frequently unethical. This
familiar group carries no briefcases, for its repertoire consists solely of plea bargaining. Downie contends that even the more professional defense bar forms a
working partnership with the system's other participants to promote efficiency
rather than dispense justice.
Chapter four continues the theme. While extolling Legal Aid lawyers-the
civil law counterparts to public defenders-for "giving tirelessly of their meagerly
remunerated time, ' 4 Downie nevertheless castigates them for allegedly regarding
indigent clients as "charity cases, with no particular right to free legal help."5
Downie also criticizes the reluctance to seek meaningful legal confrontation with
government or business to alter drastically the power equation between rich and
poor. In chapter five, he advocates no fault automobile accident insurance with
its underlying economic and mathematical calculations, but asks rhetorically
whether lawyers would "find a way to push their way in and knock the plan's
economic calculations off kilter."" As far as the legal problems of the middle
class are concerned, Downie in the same chapter recommends eliminating lawyers
in several situations: non-contested divorces, simple probate matters, and home
purchasing agreements should be feasible without legal assistance. Finally,
chapter seven indicts the legal bureaucracy for self-indulgence and antagonism
1. W. Shakespeare, King Henry VI, Pt. II, Act IV, Scene II.
2. L. Downie, Justice Denied: The Case for Reform of the Courts 7-8 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Downie]. Downie is a journalist.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id. at 99.
5. Id. at 98. Downie, however, treats more favorably the federally funded Legal Servlcc
project of the Office of Economic Opportunity. See id. at 99-100.
6. Id. at 128.
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toward criticism or interference and unearths the roots of the problem in the
nation's law schools.7
Given this recurrent theme, critical review from the profession may seem
suspect. Syllogistically building on Downie's prenuse, the book can be immunized
from criticism by legal practitioners and academicians: (1) Those in the profession will disapprove.8 (2) The reviewer belongs to the profession. (3) Ergo,
the review will be carping. The invalidity, of course, inheres in the premise.
Today, many in the profession, often stimulated and encouraged by academe,
urgently strive both to illuminate and remedy the defects in the judicial system.
Downie contradictorily concedes this when he credits the profession with the
reforms he suggests.9 Thus, critical review of the book by the profession need
not be suspect.
Although Downie properly and skillfully portrays a judicial crisis that merits
immediate and sedulous scrutiny, he must be faulted for failing to contribute
significantly to solutions. First, he does not always perceive the complex legal
and practical dimensions of the problems he poses; second, he attempts too much.
With success he panoramically canvasses the judicial system, but in one short
book he does not, and probably could not, offer even in non-legalistic jargon the
depth required to intelligently suggest reforms. A complete book would be necessary to discuss thoroughly almost each of his uncovered ills and concomitant
remedies.10
This contrast between good graphic description but poor issue analysis is
evident throughout the book. Downie first depicts the criminal courts as the most
cynical places in the world where defendants are processed lke sausages in a
factory rather than treated as individual human beings. Primarily, Downie vents
his anger at plea bargaining, a system by which at least 90 percent of all defendants plead guilty."1 Whether plea bargaining per se or instead the observed
lack of due process in plea bargaining should merit the reader's wrath is somewhat unclear. In places, however, Downie seems dearly to be aiming at the
concept itself. For example, he criticizes the American Bar Association for, on
the one hand, advocating reduced sentences for some defendants who plead
guilty while, on the other hand, disfavoring heavier than justified sentences
7. Id. at 195-99. Here the author echoes his introductory remarks. See note 2 supra.
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. Id. at 211.
10. For example, the law professors who authored the recent no fault automobile insurance
proposals analyze the issue academically in one lengthy book. R. Keeton & J. O'Connell,
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965). In a second, but somewhat less lengthy work,
they explain the concept to laymen. R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, After Cars Crash: The Need
for Legal and Insurance Reform (1967). Downie in three pages discusses, and urges the reader
to assume the merits of the proposal. Downie 126-28.
11. Downie 23. The figure is Downie's. The precise figure varies among jurisdictions, depends on whether misdemeanors are included, and eludes precise calculation. Estimates range
from 60-90%. See D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence \\ithout
Trial 3 (1966); 1 L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State
Courts 9 (1965); President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, Task
Force Report: The Courts 9 (1967).
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when "'the defendant has chosen to require the prosecution to prove his guilt at
trial.' "12 To Downie, this legalistic newspeak' 3 succeeds, without constitutional
amendment, in abrogating the cherished presumption of innocence. Demonstrating acute perception, he notes that because most defendants plead guilty, the
Warren Court's controversial search and seizure and confession rulings remain
empty appellate court rhetoric. Too often, this results from sham representation
by lawyers, a reality that appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, myopically fail to acknowledge.' 4
This portrayal of injustice accompanies an attack on the inordinate delays in
the judicial system. Waiting for cases ultimately to be tried, defendants stagnate
in jail, witnesses return repeatedly to court-sometimes losing interest and not
returning at all-and police officers either spend expensive overtime hours or take
time from their regularly assigned duties. Downie fleetingly acknowledges that
drastic population growth, accelerating urbanization leading to increased crime
and new criminal procedure rulings expanding the rights of criminal defendants
account partially for the delays. But Downie unrealistically insists that the real
cause is judicial inefficiency and mismanagement. Hence, he argues that rather
than adopting constitutional shortcuts, like plea bargaining, we should concentrate on twentieth century management techniques.' Here Downie fails to perceive the actual dimensions of the problem. Given both the substantive reforms
he seeks and computerized, well-greased machinery, the system would still most
probably grind to a halt without plea bargaining and pre-trial compromises in
civil cases. Our courts, both trial and appellate, are simply inundated with cases,10
so much so that some now seriously urge not only a moratorium on granting
criminal defendants new procedural rights but also caution in enacting new
12. Downie 51. Here Downie criticizes the recommendations of ABA Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8(b) (1967).

13. Downie's assault on lawyers might win sympathy here. Perhaps only a legal mind can
feign understanding of the Association's assertion that those who go to trial under their
scheme are not, in fact, punished for this. Characteristic, too, is the Association's euphemistic
term "plea discussions" used to replace "plea bargaining," which would conjure up unacceptable practices in the reader's mind. ABA Standards, supra note 12, at 3.
14. The provision for free lawyers in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Is
watered down by the obstinate refusal of appellate courts to examine counsel's representation
for effectiveness. See, especially, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) and McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
15. Downie 145-47.
16. In 1971 there were 41,290 criminal cases filed just in the federal courts, as opposed
to 28,137 in 1960. Although 37,715 cases were disposed of, the number of pending cases In-

creased to 24,485. Only 7,456 had full trials. Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Ann.
Report of the Director 144, 192 (1971). The picture for federal appellate courts is just as
bleak. In 1971, 14,500 appeals were filed in the eleven circuits, while 4,500 cases were docketed
before the nine member Supreme Court. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Berger, Report on
Problems of the Judiciary, Aug. 14, 1972, reprinted at 93 S. Ct. 3, 4 (1972). See also Jones
v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972), justifying a summary screening procedure
because of time limitations.
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substantive civil law without first considering the docket impact on the judicial
17
system.
Downie not only fails adequately to inform the reader of the practicalities concerning plea bargaining, but also completely avoids the issue's legal merits. He
implies that plea bargaining is inconsistent with the Constitution, a view not
universally shared by those who have researched the question. A society is often
judged by the way it proceeds against those charged with crime, but Downie
offers the reader no basis for intelligently making the important value judgments
involved. Downie's views may ultimately be right; the reader, however, is entitled
to more than Downie's unsupported opinion.
In other chapters, Downie focuses on the rest of the judicial spectrum. Like
others, he seeks the decriminalization of victimless crimes: crimes relating to
gambling, narcotics, sex, and alcohol. Again, however, he fails to present a basis
for intelligent judgment. At least with respect to narcotics, especially heroin,
strong counterarguments can be raised. Nevertheless, perhaps Downie's realistic
portrait of the defendants involved and the courts of horror through which they
are processed will awaken awareness of the present system's injustice. Downie
also graphically depicts the plight of the poor against wealthier and more powerful
merchants, and identifies the holder in due course doctrine as the latter's primary
weapon of exploitation.18 Typically, however, he fails to inform the reader of the
commercial and economic arguments that can be marshaled to defend the
doctrine.
Lest the book be taken only as a plea for the poor, a succeeding chapter describes some of the myriad ways in which the bureaucratic legal system likewise
exploits the middle class: traffic court, a system "devoid of legal purpose and of
justice;"' 9 personal injury litigation, a system fraught with delay, perjury and
excessively high attorney's fees; divorce; probate; and consumer contracts.
Finally, Downie decries the lack of judicial temperament he too often observed in
the courtroom. Certainly here the profession has been unforgivably reluctant in
first admitting, and then denouncing, the contemptible behavior exhibited by too
many judges. Downie renders a service by venturing where lawyers and scholars
have feared to tread.
Downie's proposal for legal education reflects the same shallowness of analysis
evident whenever he moves from mere depiction to advocating reform. He
recommends a curriculum emphasizing trial skills and "the conditions that
actually exist in trial courts. '20 Not until his first accident case, Downie argues,
does a lawyer realize that knowledge of the law is less important than trial and
negotiation techniques; likewise, knowledge in bargaining for reduced sentences
is more valuable to the criminal defense lawyer than appellate case law3 1
17. See Address by Chief Justice Burger, supra note 16, at 5 advocating the latter.
18. Downie 77-79.
19. Id. at 118.
20. Id. at 195.
21. This criticism cannot be sloughed off cavalierly. For example, in a basic criminal
procedure course, this reviewer recently completed 45 hours emphasizing the defendant's
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Downie ignores, however, the intense scholarly debate on this issue that has raged
over the decades. Arguably, for example, with extensive training in the nuances
of constitutional doctrine, novices may pursue every possible legal defense, rather
than improperly bargain. Downie is not necessarily wrong; rather, the point is
that he summarily assumes in a few pages what others have not resolved in books.
The reader finds no basis for independent judgment.
In short, while accurately depicting the many injustices in the legal system,
Justice Denied cannot mobilize support for change. Limited by his choice to
canvass the entire spectrum, Downie does not, and could not, prepare his reader
for intelligent choice. In fact, the long range effects of his approach can be
counterproductive. The emotional portrayal of facts beckoning the reader to
seize upon facile solutions, not thoroughly reasoned, has already become the too
familiar technique of those seeking repression rather than innovative reform.22
The public critically needs nonlegalistic commentary, but to make intelligent
choices in seeking change, it also needs fair and complete treatment of the
complex issues involved and solutions proposed.

JosEPH D. GnAmo*

Children, Parents and the Courts: Juvenile Delinquency, Ungovernability
and Neglect. By Millard L. Midonick. New York: Practicing Law Institute.
1972. Pp. xiii, 209. $15.00.
Measured by the volume of legal literature which it has generated, In re Gault'
is one of the most seminal opinions ever written by the United States Supreme
Court. Gault is now five years old, and it continues to attract authors writing
generally about the significance of Gault vis-A-vis juvenile justice; 2 or writing
specifically about the significance of Gault vis-A-vis juvenile courts.8 Nevertheless, most practicing lawyers are still looking for some kind of handy, easy-tofourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights with little discussion of guilty pleas. At the least,
the student, like his layman counterpart, might come away feeling that defendants now do
enjoy every advantage. Reality, of course, is that defendants fare little better now than they
did prior to the so-called revolution in criminal justice.
22. Thus the new Supreme Court, chosen by similar appeals to public emotionalism, has
already started to erode constitutional rights so recently protected. See Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See also Dershowitz & Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198 (1971).

* Asssistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit School of Law.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. E.g., Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, Another Look at the Role of Due Process in Juvenile
Court, 6 Faro. L.Q. 233 (1972).
3. E.g., E. Lemert, Social Action and Legal Change; Revolution Within the Juvenile Court
220-22 (1970).
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read, desk manual-type volume that will enable them to do a creditable job of
representing a child in a delinquency proceeding. Ever faithful to its mission, the
Practising Law Institute has come to the rescue with the publication of Judge
Mfllard Midonick's book: Children, Parents and the Courts: Juvenile Delinquency, Ungovernabilityand Neglect.
Unfortunately, Judge Midonick and PLI may have obscured the ultimate
worth of this book by selecting such a wordy and pretentious title. In fact, the
book does not deal with Children qua Children; it generally ignores Parents; it
simply assumes the existence of Courts; it takes Delinquency as a given; and it
merely peeks at Ungovernability and Neglect. What, then, makes this book such
a worthy contribution? The answer is, quite simply, that this book is just what
the practicing lawyer has been looking for-a handy, easy-to-read, desk manualtype volume that takes the mystery out of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Even the format is a practical one. Topics are arranged in the same sequence
that a case normally takes-from jurisdiction and investigation to trial and
sentencing (Judge Midonick refers to sentencing as "disposition," which is the
correct euphemism for sentencing in a delinquency proceeding). The book points
out the similarities, and the differences, between adult criminal justice and
juvenile delinquency justice as they exist at every stage of the proceedings. Consequently, each section of the book demonstrates the degree to which criminal
law and procedure have spilled over into the law and procedure of juvenile
delinquency. Recent developments in criminal law and procedure are discussed
in terms of the parallel developments in juvenile justice. Therefore, any lawyer
who is at least moderately familiar with criminal law can learn quickly from this
book.
Judge Midonick does not stop to question the validity of maintaining two
similar but distinct legal sanctioning systems-one for adults and one for
juveniles. Instead, he concentrates on the parallels between the two systems. His
text is arranged in short sections, each containing a concise discussion of a specific issue. With a few exceptions, he makes no attempt to belabor any particular
issue or to pontificate at any point-he simply tells it like it is. Significant footnotes are provided in each section thus enabling a reader to pursue any particular subject at length, if he cares to do so. Perhaps the book should be faulted in
that the footnotes overemphasize the law of New York, the jurisdiction in which
Judge Midonick practices. For example, the book contains a two-page discussion
of something called "Ungovernability," 4 a concept which might fill a gap in the
jurisdiction of the New York Family Court. Because of some peculiar language
in the New York statutes, the Family Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with minor
kinds of offensive juvenile conduct. That matter obviously concerns Judge
Midonick, and it may concern New York lawyers, but one might suspect that the
rest of the nation will be less fascinated with it. On the other hand, all of us are
4. M. Midonick, Children, Parents and the Courts: Juvenile Delinquency, Ungovemability and Neglect 9-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Children, Parents and the Courtsl.
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concerned about how delinquency should be defined legally., Judge Midonick
treats that issue in three sentences, the substance of which is that the reader
should refer to his local statutes.6
A major fault with the book is its failure to discuss fully the role a lawyer plays
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Juvenile delinquency proceedings present
unique dilemmas particularly for a lawyer whose prior experience is limited to
more traditional courtroom settings. Lawyers feel secure in their role as
advocates when they play out that role within the adversary system of justice.
But juvenile courts are not patterned on the adversary system of justice; instead,
they reflect the notion of parens patriae.Who does the lawyer represent in such a
setting-the child, the parent of the child, or both? 7 A juvenile delinquency
proceeding is designed to "do what is best" for the child, rather than to "punish"
the child, so how does a lawyer "win" his case? Does he "get the child off" or
does he tacitly submit the child to the jurisdiction of the court in order to
obtain "what is best for the child"? 8 It seems reasonable to expect some suggestions from Judge Midonick as to how a lawyer should go about solving those
dilemmas. Indeed, Judge Midonick appreciates the problem, and he discusses
it in a section entitled "Interrelation of Court and Counsel."0 However, the
Judge offers no suggestions; nor does he explore any of the alternatives. He
merely leaves us with his opinion that "from personal observation it is evident
that the gulf between the juvenile and even the most dedicated judge has been
accented by the presence of counsel." 10
Fortunately, the book treats other issues in juvenile justice in much greater
detail and with much more insight. In fact, several sections are extremely innovative. For instance, Judge Midonick's discussion of the burgeoning notion of
right to treatment,'1 and its application to the juvenile justice system, is clearly
12
at the forefront of current legal thought.
Child abuse is another subject that the Judge discusses with special clarity
and insight.' There are few reported opinions in this area of the law. Nevertheless, some delicate legal issues are involved, such as the balance between the
parents' right to privacy on the one hand, and the state's right to investigate and
5. See Comment, "Delinquent Child": A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 Baylor L. Rev.
352 (1969).
6.

Children, Parents and the Courts 9.

7. See Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role
of Counsel, 39 Fordham, L. Rev. 375, 384-91, 398-401 (1971).

8. See McMillian & McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile CourtAdvocate or Social Worker?, 14 St. Louis U.L.J. 561 (1970).
9. Children, Parents and the Courts 171-73.
10. Id. at 173.
11. Id. at 18-26.
12. See generally Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.BA.J. 499 (1960); Note, Tie
Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1134 (1967).
13. Children, Parents and the Courts 64-72.
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police child abuse on the other hand.' 4 The Judge approaches that particular
problem by drawing analogies to Camara v. Municipal Court15 and Wyman v.
amws. 16 In Camara the United States Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of a search can only be determined by balancing the need to search against
the character of invasion which that search entails. 17 In Wyman the Supreme
Court held that requiring welfare recipients to permit home visits by case workers
was reasonable.' 8 These cases, among others, lead Judge Midonick to the conclusion that case workers investigating incidents of child abuse should have the
right to make uninvited entries into a home, at least in those cases where the
child abuse will be dealt with in a family court with no criminal prosecution
involved.
Juvenile delinquency proceedings have always been characterized as civil.
However, Gault made it clear that the mere label, "dvil," cannot be used to
deny basic constitutional guarantees to a person whose liberty is being taken
by the state.' 9 Therefore, Gault left in its wake the troublesome issue of when
to apply criminal standards and when to apply civil standards in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding.20 Judge Midonick's book contains some intriguing
comparisons between rules of criminal proceedings and rules of civil proceedings.
His analysis of criminal rules and civil rules at the pretrial discovery stage
exemplifies a balanced and thoughtful approach to the inherent tension between
the two systems. 2 ' The Judge also raises some interesting equal protection questions, viz., since an adult can secure his release on bail, even though there is a
likelihood that he will abscond, how can a juvenile in similar circumstances be
detained without bail?22 And, if an adult has a statutory right to a preliminary
m
hearing, should a juvenile have a corresponding right?2
The law of juvenile delinquency is developing so rapidly that this book serves,
at best, only as a benchmark along the way. Nevertheless, it is a valuable contribution, especially for the busy practicing lawyer. Although the treatment of
the subject matter is often perfunctory, all of the stages of a juvenile proceeding
14. See State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 12, 406 P.2d 208, 214 (1965), aftd, 8 Ariz. App.
514, 447 P.2d 896 (1968) (the court suggested that under the applicable statute a peace
officer with reasonable cause had not only the right but also the duty to enter premis.es,
investigate, and take the child into custody, if necessary, with or without a search warrant).
15. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
16. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).

17. 387 U.S. at 536-37.
18. 400 U.S. at 326.
19. 387 U.S. at 49.
20. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a
standard required by the due process clause in criminal trials, is also required during the

adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding) with McKelver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971) (trial by jury, a right required by the due process clause in criminal
trials, is not required during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding).

21. Children, Parents and the Courts 83-87.
22. Id. at 78.
23. Id. at 80.
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are dealt with. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the book presents
the law and procedure in a way that emphasizes those aspects unique to juvenile
courts. In addition, the author has included some very thought-provoking
material that could be used as the basis for new and original approaches to some
of the issues in a juvenile delinquency case.
WALTR W. STEELE, JR.*

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.

